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1 Summary and conclusions 
1.1 Summary  
In 2003, the Dutch government introduced a VAT compensation fund to address the distortionary 
consequences of the European VAT regime, in particular on contracting out decisions. This study 
investigates the extent to which the introduction of this fund has affected the decisions of Dutch 
municipalities.  
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 summarised the literature on the potential advantages of contracting out, the distortionary 
effect of the European VAT legislation on public sector bodies’ contracting out decisions and the non-
fiscal refund schemes that several member states of the European Union have introduced in an 
attempt to address this problem. 
 
A broad range of empirical studies have documented that for a range of government services 
contracting out can lead to cost savings of about 20% without sacrificing the quality of the services 
provided. However, more recent evidence on the size of this efficiency gain is mixed at best. In 
addition, various other arguments are relevant for the decisions of whether to contract, such as the 
quality of external service provision and ideological and pragmatic reasons. However, a 
comprehensive explanation for the contracting out behaviour of public sector bodies is still lacking. 
Among the European empirical studies on this issue, to our knowledge only Dijkgraaf and Gradus 
(2007) described the VAT consequences of contracting out to the private sector and included a 
correction for this effect. The scarcity of contracting out research that takes the role of VAT legislation 
into account is remarkable as in the European Union contracting out leads to a VAT liability that 
increases the gross costs but not the net costs of service provision. If this VAT effect is not excluded, 
then studies that test for the cost advantage of contracting out may underestimate the size of this effect. 
 
In Chapter 2, we stated that the non-fiscal refund schemes – as introduced for local governments by 
several northern member states of the European Union and Norway – are an adequate budgetary 
solution to this distortion. Although other elements can be relevant to achieve a level playing field, the 
introduction of a VAT refund scheme seems to be important to facilitate contracting out and a more 
efficient local government. For example, as far as the data show, countries with a solution to this 
distortion have largely contracted out refuse collection. In the context of VAT distortions, the 
available data for Denmark, Sweden and Norway suggest that the introduction of the VAT refund 
schemes has led to an increase in external service delivery by local governments.  
However, because such schemes leave the VAT rules unchanged, other member states of the European 
Union remain subject to the distortionary effects of VAT. Moreover, the distortion still holds for 
private and in most EU member states also public suppliers of tax-exempt activities. This may lead to 
significant efficiency losses in sectors such as health care and education. Thus, while VAT 
compensation schemes introduced at a country level may help offset distortions in decision making 
resulting from the VAT, such distortions will continue to exist to some extent unless the European 
Union modifies the VAT rules themselves. 
Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, we turned our attention to the case of the Netherlands and describe the Dutch VAT 
compensation fund upon its implementation in 2003. 
 
European VAT legislation implicitly makes a broad distinction between taxable activities, tax-exempt 
activities and non-taxable activities, most being public tasks. Public sector bodies, non-profit 
organisations and charities are not entitled to a refund of VAT paid on their tax-exempt and non-
taxable activities. As a consequence, the VAT regime may cause distortions in these bodies’ decision 
making, particularly with respect to the choice between self-supply and contracting out to the private 
sector as the latter incurs costs associated with the VAT charged, whereas the former does not. In 
addition, these bodies have an incentive to avoid tax. Finally, VAT potentially hinders the lending of 
personnel between these organisations. 
 
Thus, if a private sector company is able to perform a certain activity at a lower cost than the public 
sector body can itself, under contracting out the activity might nonetheless be more expensive because 
the VAT charged on the services provided by the private sector increases the price of the activity. 
Such consequences may, therefore, influence a public body’s choice between carrying out an activity 
itself versus contracting out to the private sector. This suggests that public sector bodies face a 
threshold on contracting out. When a private contractor and a public sector body compete for the 
supply for a service, the price offered by the private contractor has to be significantly less expensive to 
be competitive. 
 
Like the VAT refund schemes introduced elsewhere in Europe, the VAT compensation fund – as 
introduced by the Dutch government in 2003 – offers a budgetary solution to this VAT distortion. In 
principle, municipalities, provinces and regional public sector bodies are entitled to a refund of the 
VAT costs incurred on their non-taxable activities. The arrangement was financed – in a budgetary 
neutral way – by a reduction of the general grant, raised with the extra VAT receipts derived from the 
increase in contracting out. The assumption underlying this fund is that given a more level playing 
field, public sector bodies will be more likely to pursue a balanced choice between self-supply and 
contracting out and to take advantages of the potentially higher efficiency gains by contracting certain 
services out to the private sector.  
 
During the years in which the VAT compensation fund was being discussed and designed, most 
national parties involved were convinced of the benefits of a more level playing field for contracting 
out, with only a few specific municipalities and provinces raising serious concerns on the proposal. 
Their unions paid more attention to the balance between the advantages and disadvantages. However, 
as an ex ante empirical study on the existence of the VAT distortion, the motives of Dutch 
municipalities and provinces for contracting out and the consequences of the introduction of the fund 
was lacking, an objective ex ante comparison between the fund’s expected costs and benefits could not 
be made. When the bill went to parliament, it was accepted unanimously. An important explanation 
for this positive and relatively unquestioning opinion may be the prevailing ideology-based spirit that 
outsourcing and a level playing field between in-house supply and contracting out to the private sector 
is preferable. 
 
Around the time of the introduction of the fund, a substantial number of practical problems became 
known. For instance, it became clear that the fund would result in a reduction of grants awarded by the 
European Union, high administrative costs and a negative budgetary impact because of the asset-
related accounting problem. These issues were not clear during the parliamentary process of 
lawmaking. The cash-based budgetary effects, because of the difference between the cut in the general 
grant and the amount of compensation of VAT for an individual municipality, were relevant as well, 
although these effects were temporarily reduced during the first years. Thus, municipalities and 
provinces did not assess the fund positively, which hindered its smooth acceptance.  
 
In addition to the introduction of a level playing field with respect to contracting out, the fund aimed 
to terminate the incentive to start fiscal schemes to avoid the levying of VAT and to ease the lending 
of employees between public sector bodies. On both issues, the extent of the VAT problem was not 
clear, and a recent evaluation by the Ministry of Finance suggested that the use of these schemes had 
diminished, although the rules for compensation had created new borders and, therefore, although on a 
lesser scale, incentives to maximise the compensation of VAT.  
 
However, the introduction of the fund came with a number of positive side effects as well. For 
instance, the fund forced municipalities to free up resources to improve their administrative 
organisations. More importantly, it increased the purchasing power of municipalities for compensable 
activities, as they only had to raise tax revenues sufficient to cover their net costs. The purchasing 
power of hidden reserves also increased upon the introduction of the fund, as expenditures could now 
be undertaken less the costs of VAT. 
 
For a considerable number of municipal activities, namely tax-exempt activities such as education and 
welfare, the VAT distortion remained. In addition, other public sector bodies such as regional water 
authorities and suppliers of tax-exempt activities, as well as private and public health care 
organisations, remain subject to the VAT distortion. By contrast, over the past decade none of these 
bodies has insisted on a solution to the problem. This might be explained by both the non-existence of 
these distortions and the drawbacks of the solutions as a compensation fund. Nevertheless, before the 
elections of the Dutch parliament in 2010, almost all political parties proposed in their electoral 
platforms the introduction of a VAT compensation fund for the care sector in order to make the 
contracting out of activities to the private sector more attractive. This proposal seemed to be more the 
result of the structural yields of €0.2 billion, as globally expected by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis, than the expected benefits of the introduction of a level playing field as 
such.  
 
For both the municipalities and the provinces, the fund has seen since its introduction a higher growth 
rate than the actual non-taxable expenditures of these bodies. This might be an indication that these 
bodies have slightly increased their extent of contracting out to the private sector, what can be 
attributed to the introduction of the fund. However, we cannot exclude that this was a pre-existing 
trend independent of the introduction of the fund.  
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 described – based on an e-mail survey among all Dutch municipalities – the first general 
evaluation on the effectiveness of the VAT compensation fund on contracting out decisions.  
 
Before the introduction of the fund, the negative opinion of most municipalities dominated, for 
example because of the administrative consequences, and the introduction came with several 
transitional problems. Therefore, we were interested in the effects on contracting out decisions and the 
opinions of municipalities on the fund. Based on an e-mail survey to all Dutch municipalities in 2006, 
three years after the fund’s introduction, we investigated its effectiveness. We questioned all 
municipalities about (1) the actual extent of contracting out, (2) the effect of the introduction of the 
fund on the outsourcing of activities and (3) the opinions of the municipalities on the fund. The survey 
was sent to the aldermen responsible for budgetary affairs. A representative database of 198 
municipalities (response rate 43%) was available for analyses.  
 
As the results of this study show, for most of the municipalities VAT did in practice not hinder the 
contracting out of public services. Therefore, the fund largely lacks legitimacy. In general, 
municipalities have a negative opinion on this fund and judge it to be redundant because of the 
administrative consequences (partly due to the unfamiliarity with the VAT legislation), the budgetary 
effects and, more importantly, the absence of the VAT distortion. In addition, a large share of their 
activities had already been contracted out before the introduction of the fund and the outsourcing of 
services was not a political item. Therefore, the cost effects of contracting out – being the balance 
between the potential efficiency of private suppliers and the extra costs of VAT – play a minor role in 
considering whether to contract out. In addition, the introduction of the fund did not cause a significant 
increase in contracting out during the first years. Municipalities argue that factors other than the 
budgetary effects – such as institutional and pragmatic considerations – are more relevant to the 
decision-making process on outsourcing. For example, they mention the optimal size of their own 
organisations, the necessary knowledge for specific activities, the vulnerability of municipal activities, 
the lack of capacity in their own organisations, the legal status of municipal employees and concern 
for employment in the municipality itself. Although in some municipalities outsourcing is expected to 
take place in the coming years, most municipalities state that there is no relationship between this 
expectation and the introduction of the VAT compensation fund.  
Chapter 5 
As chapter 4 showed, motives other than budgetary consequences might be more relevant to decision 
making on contracting out. In an explorative study involving direct interviews with 17 municipal 
managers, we investigated the motives behind the decisions to contract out activities or not. 
 
As the analysis in chapter 5 showed, the mode of service provision is, in general, not a managerial 
issue. Municipalities do not regularly evaluate the costs or quality of their service provisions in 
comparison with alternatives. If the activity shows an adequate performance without complaints, a 
cause for considering a change of supplier is, in general, absent. By contrast, in the case of structural 
underperformance, initiating complaints about the performance of the municipal organisation or the 
quality of the activities, the mode of task execution develops into an issue for evaluation. As a result, 
outsourcing the service is an option. In addition, institutional changes, such as the introduction of new 
legislation, the decentralisation of tasks, or the construction of new buildings, may be an opportunity 
to consider contracting out. However, a merger of municipalities is not a relevant juncture for 
changing the mode of service provision. In most municipalities, in-house service provision might be 
explained by the lack of a cause for considering contracting out, as this is the default position. This 
may be an additional explanation for the fact that the explanatory power of previous empirical studies 
on municipal contracting out decisions is generally low.  
 
The efficiency motive is the most relevant aspect when a municipality is weighing up the pros and 
cons of contracting out. In comparison to previous empirical studies, the relevance of this motive 
seems to be independent of the size of the municipality. For smaller municipalities, other motives such 
as the stability of service provision and the quality of external service providers are far more relevant. 
Therefore, these motives might be a more relevant explanation for the statistically significant negative 
relationship between municipal size and outsourcing found in previous empirical studies. With respect 
to ideological motives, left-wing municipalities are less prone to contract out their service deliveries 
than are right-wing ones, especially to private providers. Some municipalities report that the private 
ideological opinion of strong local politicians or municipal managers about the positive consequences 
of contracting out is relevant as well.  
 
When contracting out, municipalities decide between the external public and private execution of their 
activities for various reasons. In general, the efficiency motive and the quality of service provision are 
most relevant. Contracting out to a private party is preferred to get to grips with the execution, 
although other municipal managers explain that service provision by a public organisation provides 
more opportunity to have influence. 
 
In addition to the common public choice and transaction cost motives, the study shows the importance 
of institutional motives such as the stability of service provision, the independence of external 
providers and the legal status and retirement decisions of municipal employees. These motives are 
especially relevant for smaller municipalities. However, the most important institutional aspect is that 
the actual contracting out discussion is caused by a structural dissatisfaction with the service provision 
or a change in the task because of new legislation or other external factors. In addition, 
pragmatic/organisational motives such as the lack of availability of enough personnel and the lack of 
availability of expertise in the organisation are relevant for outsourcing considerations, especially for 
smaller municipalities.  
 
This study, therefore, bridges institutional and rational choice explanations of action, as both types of 
motivations are used to explain contracting out behaviour by Dutch municipalities. Institutional 
motives seem to be particularly relevant as catalysts for initiating the evaluation of organisational 
performance, whereas rational/economical motives are used to compare alternative service providers. 
In addition, municipal decision making is influenced by more pragmatic motives.  
1.2 General conclusion 
Based on the analyses in the previous chapters, as summarized in section 6.1, we will now answer the 
central question of this study: 
 
What are the benefits of the introduction of the Dutch VAT compensation fund, in particular on 
municipalities’ decisions of whether to contract out? 
 
The VAT compensation fund addresses the VAT distortion for a range of activities pursued by 
municipalities, provinces and regional public sector bodies. The budgetary solution is by definition 
only adequate for those parts of the activities of these bodies that are entitled to compensation. The 
solution is largely similar with the refund schemes in other member states of the European Union such 
as Denmark, Sweden and Finland. However, this indirect budgetary solution is still second best, as the 
distortion should be addressed by a change in European VAT legislation.  
 
The introduction of the fund was based on the premise that municipalities, provinces and regional 
public sector bodies faced a significant threshold on contracting out to the private sector. Remarkably, 
during the preparation of the Dutch VAT compensation fund, an integral ex ante empirical comparison 
of costs and benefits of the proposals was not made. Therefore, the introduction was more based on a 
belief in the potential advantages of contracting out and the distortionary effect of VAT in line with 
the positive market-oriented thinking during the 1990s. Although formally the only purpose of the 
fund was to achieve a level playing field between self-supply and contracting out, implicitly an 
increase in contracting out to the private sector was expected. However, as this study shows, 
municipalities do not perceive the distortionary effect of VAT explicitly. For most activities, VAT did 
not hinder outsourcing and the introduction of VAT compensation did not cause a significant increase 
in contracting out since motives other than budgetary effects led the decision-making process on 
outsourcing. Municipalities have a far broader range of motives in favour or against contracting out, 
although the efficiency argument is still relevant. Institutional motives, such as the stability of service 
provision, are relevant, in particular for smaller municipalities. Even more relevant is that only in the 
case of structural underperformance, a change in their tasks or other institutional changes do 
municipalities start to consider an alternative mode of service provision. As this study shows, the 
introduction of the VAT compensation fund was not such a momentum. Nevertheless, because of the 
introduction of a level playing field with respect to VAT, the choice to contract out for other than 
budgetary reasons no longer had a fiscal threshold. The introduction and execution of the fund came 
with substantial transition costs, because of the complexity of the fund legislation and its subsequent 
administrative consequences. Finally, the fund had significant distributive budgetary effects, as the 
receipts from the VAT compensation fund might deviate from the share of the municipality in the cut 
in the general grant, made to fund the regime. In many cases, these effects were negative. We can 
conclude that the VAT compensation fund, therefore, lacks a great deal of its legitimacy as the 
municipalities explain that levying of VAT did not explicitly hinder the decision to contract out their 
activities.  
 
By contrast, next to a range of other motives, municipalities report that the efficiency motive is 
relevant when they consider a change in the mode of service provision of an activity. However, a 
higher external efficiency is often supposed to be included because municipalities do not always make 
a cost comparison between contracting out and in-house supply. Therefore, the fund should – at least 
implicitly – have a positive gradual effect on outsourcing by municipalities, the costs of their task 
execution and the efficiency of local government. For both municipalities and provinces, the fund has 
since its introduction seen a higher growth rate than the actual non-taxable expenditures of these 
bodies. This might be an indication that these bodies have slightly increased their contracting out to 
the private sector. However, this might be a pre-existing trend independent of the introduction of the 
fund. This finding is consistent with the cautious positive conclusions on the effectiveness of 
comparable systems in other European countries.  
 
In addition to the introduction of a level playing field with respect to contracting out, the fund had to 
two other objectives: the termination of the incentive to start fiscal schemes to avoid the levying of 
VAT and to ease the lending of employees between public sector bodies. In theory, the introduction of 
the fund should have had a positive effect on both issues. However, neither this study nor other 
evaluations have provided evidence on either the extent of the problem or the impact of the 
introduction of the fund.  
 
As this study shows, the outsourcing of activities is more attractive for smaller than it is for larger 
municipalities. Over future years, a new series of municipal mergers is expected, leading to a far 
smaller number of smaller municipalities, what might lead to less pressure on contracting out. By 
contrast, as the budgetary positions of Dutch municipalities decline because of the impact of the recent 
financial crises, municipalities may wish to profit from the potential efficiency gains of outsourcing 
activities to the private sector. Budget cuts as they result from the central government’s fiscal policy 
may be another institutional factor, instigating a search for opportunities for cost reductions. Therefore 
it is possible that the fund will still provide impetus to outsourcing, and thereby might be assessed 
more positively.  
 
With respect to the negative opinions of some municipalities, it would be useful if the Dutch central 
government supported the proper evaluation of municipal task execution and the development of 
municipal purchase capacity because both aspects might help achieve a more positive assessment of 
the fund. 
 
Finally, this study shows that an ex ante policy evaluation should be executed properly in case of a 
thorough policy implementation with far-reaching implications. Such a study should include both an 
adequate empirical analysis of the benefits and an overview of the side effects, where administrative 
aspects should not be neglected. In particular, the pros and cons of the introduction of a VAT 
compensation fund for the care sector, which is part of the coalition agreement of the new Dutch 
administration, should be assessed thoroughly. 
1.3 Directions for future research 
This study analyses the effectiveness of the VAT compensation fund for municipalities, provinces and 
regional public sector bodies to address a number of distortions on their decision making as far as their 
non-taxable activities are concerned. Based on the results of this study, four future research projects 
can be defined that could increase the insight into the contracting out decisions of (public) 
organisations and the resulting impact of the VAT distortion. 
Relevance of the VAT distortion for tax-exempt activities and other types of organisations 
As chapter 3 described, despite the VAT distortion for different types of activities (tax-exempt and 
non-taxable) in different types of organisations, such as regional water authorities, police 
organisations, health care institutions, educational bodies and financial institutions, the regime of the 
VAT compensation fund is limited to three decentralised tiers of government and most of their non-
taxable activities. Despite the various motives for the exclusion of the other types of activities and 
organisations for compensation, it would be relevant to investigate whether the VAT distortion is 
important for these bodies. Because some of these bodies act in a competitive environment, they might 
have more incentives to focus on the costs of activities and the opportunities of service delivery and 
task execution by other organisations. This study might be especially interesting because almost all 
political parties intend to introduce a VAT compensation fund for the health care sector, with an 
expected positive budgetary effect of € 0.2 billion. Furthermore, the coalition agreement of the new 
administration has pledged to investigate the introduction of a VAT compensation fund for both the 
care and cure sectors. 
Differences in the refund schemes for the VAT distortion 
Chapter 2 described the solutions for the VAT distortion that have been introduced in several EU 
member states. On a number of aspects – such as the funding of the refund schemes and the 
delineation of compensation with respect to VAT-exempt activities, the involved governments have 
made different arrangements. A more in-depth analysis of these refund schemes – for example, by 
comparing the extent of contracting out in these states for different types of activities – might provide 
insight into the impact of these choices on the use and effectiveness of the solutions. In particular, the 
impact of the inclusion of tax-exempt activities on the contracting out of these services might be 
interesting to study. 
Institutional and pragmatic motives for contracting out 
As chapter 4 and 5 concluded, in addition to the hypotheses of public choice and transaction cost 
theory, other motives are relevant when deciding modes of service provision of activities. In particular, 
chapter 5 showed that when a catalyst for considering a change of provider is lacking, a comparison 
between different types of task execution would not be made. Institutional theories assume that a 
primary determinant of organisational structure is the pressure exerted by external and internal 
constituencies on the organisation to conform to a set of expectations to gain legitimacy and so secure 
access to vital resources and long-term survival. In particular, the stability of service provision – in 
particular in smaller municipalities – and the potential difference between internal- and external-
oriented activities were noted in this study. In addition, pragmatic/organizational motives such as the 
lack of availability of expertise or sufficient personnel in the organisation are relevant. It would be 
interesting to extend this study by both the number of municipalities and the number of activities in 
order to investigate the modes and impacts of institutional and pragmatic motives more thoroughly. In 
addition, it would also be appropriate to investigate whether these motives are relevant for other types 
of public and private organisations such as health care organisations and regional water authorities. 
Relevance of the efficiency motive and the solution to the VAT distortion in the case of declining 
budgets  
Chapter 5 concluded that when considering an alternative mode of service provision, the efficiency 
motive is most relevant. However, chapters 4 and 5 also concluded that the municipalities consider the 
fund redundant because as a solution for the VAT distortion would be irrelevant for their decision 
making. Therefore, the efficiency motive seems to have more of an implicit relevance, as 
municipalities use other motives to start evaluating the mode of service provision or decide whether to 
contract out. The consequences of the recent financial crisis indicate that more municipalities will have 
an incentive to start a discussion on the actual modes of their service provision. Therefore, it would be 
relevant to investigate whether the lagging development of their budgets is a relevant momentum and 
leads to an increase in contracting out activities. In particular, it would be relevant to investigate 
whether municipalities faced with a negative budgetary effect because of the introduction of the VAT 
compensation fund increased their contracting out following its introduction. Opponents of the fund 
suggested its introduction would not only create a level playing field, but also introduce a force for 
contracting out to address this negative budgetary effect. 
 
